Monitoring: Mass Departure of Belarusian Men of Conscription Age After the Beginning of the War (2022-2025)

Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, Belarus has seen an unprecedented exodus of draft-age men. Fearing mobilization, repression and sanctions-driven decline, tens of thousands left for the EU, the Caucasus, Turkey and Central Asia. Court records and residence-permit data confirm a sustained outflow reshaping the labor market, draining skills and building new diasporas.

Introduction and Causes of Emigration Among Young Men

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 became the trigger for a new wave of emigration from Belarus. Inside the country, fears intensified that Belarus might be drawn into the war on Russia’s side – a prospect that particularly alarmed young men of conscription age who faced a possible mobilization.¹ Although Belarusian troops have not officially participated in the war, the close military and political alliance between Minsk and Moscow fuelled persistent rumors of a potential draft. Many young Belarusians preferred not to take the risk and left the country pre-emptively in anticipation of mobilization. At the same time, internal factors driving emigration remained unchanged – the continuing political repression since 2020 and the worsening economic situation under sanctions. As a result, from the very first days of the war, a mass outflow of young Belarusians abroad was observed, documented in numerous media reports, blogs, and social-media testimonies.

Belarusian human rights defenders report a noticeable rise in draft evasion cases against the backdrop of the military situation. According to the human-rights initiative Our House, the authorities have intensified efforts to replenish the army (for example, by easing medical fitness requirements for conscription), while young people increasingly seek to avoid military service.²

In 2022 alone, 79 criminal cases for draft evasion were opened in Minsk, and in the Hrodna Region the military commissar reported that 20–25 conscripts in each draft simply failed to appear – often having left for EU countries, which refused to extradite them.

Overall, about 375 people in Belarus were convicted of draft evasion in 2022, and 266 people in 2023. These figures were disclosed by Supreme Court Judge Vladimir Davydov in an interview with the state newspaper Respublika.³ ⁴

Taken together, these data confirm that a significant share of young Belarusian men chose emigration over conscription amid the uncertainty of wartime conditions.

Scale of Population Outflow

Since late February 2022, emigration from Belarus has reached unprecedented levels.

Official statistics acknowledge that more than 200,000 citizens left the country over 2021–2022.⁵ The Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs noted that those who departed were predominantly people of working age. By October 2023, Belarusian authorities estimated the cumulative outflow since 2020 at approximately 350,000 people.

Independent experts provide broader estimates ranging from 100,000 to 500,000 emigrants, citing the difficulty of accurate accounting. This makes the current outflow comparable to the largest migration waves in the country’s history.⁶ Analysts point out that, by the rate of population loss – around 100,000 people per year during 2021–2023 – the current exodus is second only to emigration during the world wars.⁷

In total, since 2020, more than half a million Belarusians are estimated to have left the country, which already has a tangible impact on both demography and the national economy. ⁸

A distinctive feature of this wave of Belarusian emigration is its predominantly young and male profile.⁹ According to Eurostat, 79% of Belarusians who obtained their first residence permit in the European Union in 2024 were aged 20–59, primarily 30–39 years old. Moreover, among new EU residence permit holders in recent years, men significantly outnumber women – approximately 64% men versus 36% women.

In other words, those leaving are primarily of military and working age. The IT sector has been particularly affected: between 2020 and 2023, Belarus lost about 13,500 IT specialists, many of them young men who left after 2022 due to the war and political repression.

The overall outflow of skilled labor has already caused a shortage of the workforce and further aggravated the country’s demographic decline.

First Months of the War: A Surge in Emigration

Immediately after the outbreak of the war, there was a sharp surge in the number of young Belarusians leaving the country, particularly to neighboring visa-free destinations. In Georgia, the inflow of arrivals from Belarus increased severalfold.

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, from February 24 to March 16, 2022, a total of 15,777 Belarusian citizens¹⁰ entered the country – compared to only 1,678 during the same period in 2019. This represents nearly a tenfold increase in arrivals.

For comparison, during the same three weeks of the war, the inflow of Russian citizens amounted to around 30,000 (of whom nearly 18,000 soon departed), while no large influx of Ukrainians was recorded by Georgian authorities.

Such a sharp rise in Belarusian arrivals during the first weeks of the war is explained by the fact that thousands of young Belarusian men hurriedly left the country, fearing border closures or potential mobilization.

Similar patterns were observed elsewhere. By May 2022, an estimated over 45,000 Belarusians and Russians had relocated to Georgia¹¹ – with a significant proportion being Belarusians. Between February and July 2022, approximately 12,050 Belarusian citizens were officially registered as arrivals in Armenia.

Many Belarusian IT specialists and freelancers used those months as an opportunity to relocate abroad. It is estimated that the net outflow of IT professionals from Belarus between January and November 2022 reached about 15,000 people.¹²

Beyond the Caucasus, Turkey became one of the first destinations of refuge – largely due to its visa-free regime and regular direct flights from Minsk.

As early as March 2022, rental prices in Turkey surged two to three times as a result of the influx of people from Russia and Belarus.¹³ Belarusians actively applied for tourist residence permits in Turkey; however, by 2023, Turkish authorities had tightened the rules.

According to accounts from relocated Belarusians, those who obtained residence permits for the first time after February 2022 found it virtually impossible to renew them. In 2024, many Belarusians reportedly received mass refusals of extensions and were ordered to leave the country.¹⁴

These developments indirectly indicate that a significant number of Belarusians moved to Turkey specifically after the start of the war.

Kazakhstan also became a popular destination for those fleeing.

Before 2022, Belarusians were able to stay in Kazakhstan almost continuously – it was sufficient to cross the border every 30 days.

However, since January 2023, due to the increased inflow of relocants, Kazakhstan restricted visa-free stays to 90 days within a 180-day period.

In effect, this closed the loopholes for those attempting to remain in the country long-term without official status.

Although no precise data are publicly available on the number of Belarusians who moved to Kazakhstan, such legal changes clearly indicate that the migration flow from Belarus was significant.

Moreover, the sharp rise in Russian arrivals in Kazakhstan in the autumn of 2022 – after Russia’s mobilization announcement, when about 98,000 Russians entered the country within a few weeks – demonstrated Kazakhstan’s attractiveness as a refuge, and Belarusians also took advantage of this opportunity.

Main Destinations and Country Statistics

Emigration from Belarus has spanned a wide range of destinations – from neighboring European states to more distant countries. Below is an overview of the main directions of departure for Belarusian men of conscription age since the beginning of the war:

Poland and the European Union:

Since 2022, the European Union as a whole has received hundreds of thousands of Belarusian citizens. The number of first residence permits issued to Belarusians in the EU rose sharply from 150,000 in 2021 to 311,567 in 2022 – more than double.¹⁵ In 2023, the figure slightly declined to around 281,000, yet remained abnormally high.

Poland became the absolute leader: in 2022 alone, it issued over 150,000 residence permits to Belarusian citizens.¹⁶ In 2024, Poland remained in first place (151,000 permits), followed by Lithuania (~15.8 thousand).
These countries border Belarus and have historically served as the first havens for those fleeing repression.

However, starting in mid-2022, the Baltic states introduced stricter policies: Lithuania suspended the issuance of visas and residence permits for many categories of Belarusians, particularly those with ties to the Belarusian military or defense industry. Latvia adopted similar restrictions.

Despite this, most young Belarusians who had already relocated there managed to legalize their stay under humanitarian programs or through employment.
Georgia and the Caucasus:

Georgia became one of the main relocation hubs. By spring 2022, tens of thousands of Belarusians had settled there, significantly influencing the local economy – migrants contributed to GDP growth and stimulated the IT, financial, and service sectors.

Estimates of the number of Belarusian relocants in Georgia vary. According to Georgian government data as of 1 January 2025, 12,800 citizens of Belarus were officially residing in the country. However, this figure does not account for everyone who arrived after the war began – some may have moved elsewhere or obtained other citizenships.
In Armenia, the Belarusian diaspora also grew: over 12,000 Belarusians arrived there within the first six months of the war.
These countries remain attractive because of their long visa-free stay regimes (Georgia allows Belarusians to stay up to 360 days per year without a visa) and their relatively low barriers for establishing a business or working as freelancers.
Many of those who relocated were young men seeking to avoid conscription at home. However, recent years have brought new difficulties: Georgia has seen an increase in residence-permit rejections for Belarusians and introduced more migration screening measures.
For example, a well-known Belarusian activist was reportedly denied re-entry to Georgia in 2023 after a short trip abroad, effectively banning him from returning.
This illustrates that Georgian authorities have begun scrutinizing arrivals from Belarus more carefully, amid the ongoing war and regional security concerns.
Turkey and the Middle East: Due to its visa-free entry for up to 90 days, Turkey quickly became filled with IT professionals, freelancers, and entrepreneurs from Belarus. Most Belarusians settled in Istanbul and in resort areas such as Antalya and Alanya, typically obtaining tourist residence permits.
According to migrant testimonies, during 2022–2023, entire communities of young Belarusians emerged in Turkish cities. However, by 2023, Turkey had tightened its migration regulations – residence permits issued after February 2022 were no longer being extended on a mass scale.
As a result, some Belarusian relocants in Turkey were forced to move onward – some to the European Union, others to the Caucasus. Nevertheless, Turkey remains an important transit hub: Belarusians continue to depart via Istanbul’s international flights, and the flow of tourists and relocants through Turkey has not ceased.
Central Asia: In addition to Kazakhstan, Belarusian migrants also relocated to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – countries offering visa-free entry and a lower cost of living. Although precise statistics are unavailable, official data indicate that the number of registered Belarusians in Kyrgyzstan increased in 2022.
Uzbekistan temporarily attracted Belarusian specialists, but language and cultural differences made adaptation more challenging than in European destinations, which is why these routes have remained secondary directions for Belarusian migration.

Situation in 2023–2025: Ongoing Outflow

Although the most intensive departures occurred during the first months of the war, the emigration wave has continued into its third consecutive year. By the end of 2023, as noted earlier, the number of Belarusians who obtained residence permits in the EU remained at approximately 281,000, and in 2024 – around 175,000 more. The decline in 2024 is partly explained by the fact that most of those who wished and were able to leave had already done so in 2022–2023. Nevertheless, new restrictions have not fully stopped the outflow: many Belarusians continue seeking more stable living conditions abroad.

Belarus’s population is declining both naturally and through emigration. According to independent demographers, as of early 2024, the population of Belarus fell below 9.0 million for the first time in years, whereas the authorities had hoped to maintain the level of 9.1 million.

The emigration of young men has significantly affected the national economy: the country faces a severe labor shortage across multiple sectors, and the number of employed persons in Belarus has decreased by approximately 200,000 between 2018 and 2024, correlating with a slowdown in GDP growth. The government has even attempted to attract foreign workers (for example, from Asian countries), but such efforts have met with little success.

It is important to note that data accuracy remains limited, as official statistics do not account for all those who have left. Many Belarusians departed without formally reporting their exit, travelling on tourist visas or via third countries.

Nevertheless, the consolidation of various sources – including the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs and EU statistical data – confirms the overall picture: since February 2022, a massive exodus of young Belarusian men has taken place, spreading them across different parts of the world.

Testimonies in Media and Social Networks

Numerous reports in independent media, blogs, and Telegram channels have described this wave of emigration in detail. Belarusian independent outlets published personal stories of IT professionals, students, and entrepreneurs who fled the country due to the war. For example, Zerkalo.io reported how a young Belarusian family fled through Georgia to Poland in 2022, fearing persecution and potential conscription.

The human rights initiative Our House (“Nash Dom”) regularly reports within its campaign “No Means No”, documenting cases where young men choose to hide or emigrate rather than serve in the army that could potentially be drawn into the aggression against Ukraine.

In spring 2022, social media platforms were filled with discussions about overcrowded Minsk–Istanbul flights, long queues at EU and Russian land borders, and warnings in Belarusian Telegram channels about a possible exit ban for men – which only accelerated departures while it was still possible.

International media also noted this trend. The Jamestown Foundation observed that a significant number of Belarusians fled the country after the brutal crackdown on the 2020 protests – and especially after the start of the war – stating that “the war has become the key factor pushing Belarusians to leave their homeland.”¹⁷

An analytical brief by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) highlighted that the fear of mobilization linked to the war gave new impetus to the exodus of Belarusian youth.¹⁸

This topic has also drawn the attention of international human rights organizations, which view forced conscription and the coercive recruitment of activists as a form of state repression. The use of military enlistment offices to punish politically active youth has led many activists to see emigration as the only way to escape imprisonment or forced military service.

Conclusions

The collected evidence clearly demonstrates that since the start of the war in Ukraine, Belarus has experienced a mass departure of men of conscription age. Thousands – even tens of thousands – of young Belarusians, including highly qualified professionals, left the country in a short time for various destinations: neighboring Poland and Lithuania, relatively safe Georgia and Armenia, distant Turkey, and others.

The first months after February 24, 2022, marked the peak of this exodus, but the process continues to this day, albeit at a slower pace. The main drivers remain the fear of Belarus being drawn into the war (and of potential mobilization) and the refusal of young men to serve a regime that uses the military for repression and possible aggression.

The reliability of the data presented relies on official statistics (Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Eurostat), independent research, and direct media testimonies.

All sources converge on the same conclusion: since 2022, Belarus has been undergoing an unprecedented population outflow, comparable in scale to wartime migration.

This mass departure of conscription-age men weakens the economy, exacerbates demographic challenges, and gives rise to a new Belarusian diaspora abroad.

For international human rights institutions, this situation serves as clear evidence of how war and state repression drive forced migration of youth, depriving them of their fundamental right to live in safety and peace in their homeland.

Sources and References:

Cited throughout the report – include materials from independent Belarusian media (Zerkalo.io, Nasha Niva, Office Life, Belsat, Dev.by), international analytical reports (ICMPD, Jamestown Foundation), and human rights organizations (Our House).

All sources concur that since February 2022, a large-scale emigration of young Belarusians has occurred due to war-related threats and repression.

1 https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/64600/file/PP%2520Policy%2520Brief_Belarus%2520Migration%2520Trends_RU.pdf#:~:text=%D0%91%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D1%8C%20%D0%BE%D1%84%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%BE%20%D0%BD%D0%B5%20%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BB%D1%8F%D0%BB%D0%B0%20%D1%81%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B8,%D0%B5%D0%B5%20%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9%20%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%8E%D0%B7%20%D1%81%20%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B9

2 В РБ взялись за уклонистов. Как их находят и наказывают? – DW – 02.05.2024

3 Администрация Советского района – Уголовная ответственность за уклонение от мероприятий призыва на воинскую службу

4 https://euroradio.fm/ru/v-belarusi-za-uklonenie-ot-voennogo-prizyva-osuzhdili-266-chelovek

5 https://news.zerkalo.io/life/59058.html

6 https://news.zerkalo.io/economics/108999.html

7 https://planbmedia.io/important/analysis/ot-lukashenko-iz-belarusi-begut-bystree-chem-iz-za-vojn.html

8 https://nashaniva.com/ru/376023

9 https://devby.io/news/175-tysyach-belarusov-uehali-zhit-i-rabotat-v-es-v-2024-godu-a-za-poslednie-pyat-let-razreshenie-poluchili-pochti-million

10 https://officelife.media/news/31891-stalo-izvestno-skolko-belorusov-uekhalo-v-gruziyu-s-nachala-voennykh-deystviy-v-ukraine/

11 https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/64600/file/PP%2520Policy%2520Brief_Belarus%2520Migration%2520Trends_RU.pdf

12 https://officelife.media/article/people/40316-kuda-i-skolko-belorusov-uekhalo-na-rabotu-za-granitsu-v-2022-godu/