Mass Emigration of Young Russians Following the Outbreak of War (2022–2023)

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine sparked the largest youth exodus since 1917: between 2022–2023, an estimated 0.5-1 million – mainly draft-age men – left in three waves driven by repression, isolation, and mobilization. Bound for Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and beyond, they reshaped host economies while deepening Russia’s brain drain.

The start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 triggered an unprecedented wave of emigration from Russia, particularly among young men of military age. Before the war, such a large-scale exodus of youth from the country had never been observed. Experts note that this outflow became the largest since the 1917 Revolution ¹. For comparison, in previous decades emigration from Russia remained at a moderate level (for example, fewer than about 3,000 Russians moved to Finland annually), whereas in 2022 the number of emigrants increased several times over, setting a record for the past 30 years.²

The First Wave of Emigration (February – March 2022)

Immediately after the invasion on February 24, 2022, Russia saw a significant outflow of citizens—primarily members of the liberal intelligentsia, IT specialists, and activists—fearing political repression and economic instability. Within the first few weeks, hundreds of thousands left the country. According to the group OK Russians, by mid-March 2022 around 300,000 people had already fled Russia.³ BBC News reported that as of March 13, approximately 200,000 Russians had left since the start of the war.⁴ In Georgia alone, more than 25,000 Russians arrived during those days, many carrying suitcases and even pets.

As a result, demand for international flights and rental housing abroad surged dramatically. Reports described a rush for tickets to Istanbul, Yerevan, and Tbilisi, with airfare prices soaring severalfold.

The Causes of the First Wave

The main drivers of the first wave were the political repressions and censorship introduced in Russia during the early days of the war. In March 2022, the Russian authorities enacted laws imposing prison sentences of up to 15 years for “spreading false information” about the army and began persecuting anti-war activists.⁵ Many journalists, opposition politicians, and human rights defenders fled abroad to escape criminal prosecution. As journalist Boris Grozovsky put it: “We were not fleeing bombs, we were fleeing prison.”

Thousands of IT specialists also left the country: according to industry associations, approximately 50,000–70,000 IT professionals emigrated during the first month of the war. In many cases, relocation was a condition set by their foreign employers. Numerous families left together, fearing the country’s growing isolation and an impending economic crisis caused by sanctions.

One of the main destinations for emigration became the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where Russian citizens can enter without visas. Armenia received around 50,000 arrivals during the first month of the war. According to the Armenian Minister of Economy, Vahan Kerobyan, approximately 50,000 people (mostly Russian citizens) relocated to Armenia within 4–5 weeks after late February. They opened more than 20,000 new bank accounts and registered over 1,300 companies and individual enterprises.⁶

Georgia also became a key destination, welcoming at least 25,000 Russians in the first weeks of the invasion. A new émigré community quickly formed in Tbilisi; witnesses described it as if “an entire scene” of independent journalists and cultural figures had emigrated.

Turkey likewise emerged as one of the main refuges. According to a Ukrainian diplomat, by mid-April more than 100,000 Russians had arrived in Turkey and applied for residence permits. Flights to Istanbul and the resort city of Antalya were among the most in demand, and by 2022, Russian citizens became the leading foreign buyers of real estate in Turkey—granting them the right to long-term residence permits.⁷

Note: Before 2022, migration on such a scale had never been recorded. For comparison, throughout 2021, only around 30,000–40,000 people officially emigrated from Russia for permanent residence abroad (according to individual destination statistics). In Finland’s migration data, for instance, the average annual inflow of Russians during the 2010s was around 3,000 people, whereas in 2022 a total of 6,003 ⁸ Russians moved to Finland—a record high in the past three decades. Experts have called the current outflow “the largest brain drain in modern Russian history.”⁹

The Second Wave (Spring–Summer 2022)

Following the initial panic-driven exodus in February–March, a steady outflow of population continued over the subsequent months. By the summer of 2022, emigration had become more structured and deliberate. This “second wave” consisted of those who needed time to prepare their departure: affluent Russians, entrepreneurs, and families with children (many waited until the end of the school year).

In July, CNBC noted the emergence of a new wave of Russians who were formally relocating abroad to establish new lives and businesses. Many transferred their assets, registered companies overseas, or moved their employees abroad. A significant outflow of capital and business owners was anticipated: according to estimates by Henley & Partners, approximately 15,000 millionaires (individuals with substantial wealth) were expected to leave Russia in 2022 alone.

These individuals chose a range of destinations—from Dubai (UAE), which became a popular refuge for wealthy Russians, to EU countries (where Schengen visas allowed entry) and Israel (for those eligible under the Law of Return). Israel reported a sharp rise in repatriation (aliyah) from Russia: according to the Ministry of Integration, thousands of Russian Jews immigrated to Israel in the first months of the war, surpassing the figures of previous years.¹⁰

By mid-2022, the overall scale of emigration continued to grow. The Russian government did not release official statistics, but indirect data pointed to hundreds of thousands of people leaving the country. Independent estimates suggested that by August 2022, the total number of those who had left Russia could have exceeded half a million people.

Many of them were young and educated: the average age of emigrants was around 32 years.¹¹ The main motivations included opposition to the war and the political regime, the desire to secure a future for their children abroad, and growing economic uncertainty within Russia.

By summer, the impact of this migration was increasingly visible in host countries. On the one hand, the influx of highly qualified professionals brought economic benefits – in Georgia, for example, the arrival of Russian migrants reportedly contributed around 2% to the national GDP.¹² On the other hand, tensions and anti-Russian sentiment began to rise. In Georgia and Armenia, there were cases of landlords refusing to rent to Russians, and protests were held demanding the introduction of visa requirements.

Nevertheless, most of those who left during this “second wave” managed to settle abroad successfully. Many had no plans to return: according to surveys, around 70% of new emigrants expressed fear of political persecution in Russia and unwillingness to live under the current regime.

The Third Wave: Flight from Mobilization (September – October 2022)

The largest and fastest exodus of young men from Russia occurred in the autumn of 2022, following the announcement of the so-called “partial mobilization.” On 21 September, President Vladimir Putin declared a call-up of reservists for the war in Ukraine, which sparked panic among potential conscripts across the country. This marked the beginning of the third wave of emigration – driven entirely by the unwillingness of hundreds of thousands of Russians to fight in Ukraine.

Within days after the announcement, Russia’s borders were overwhelmed by lines of men of conscription age trying to leave the country by any means. During the first week after 21 September, at least 300,000 citizens left Russia. According to various estimates, by early October the number of those fleeing mobilization reached 370,000–400,000 people.¹³ Newsweek aptly headlined its report: “Putin’s Mobilization Backfires – 370,000 Russians Flee in Two Weeks.” This number was comparable to – or even exceeded – the official figure of 300,000 men drafted into the army (according to the Russian Ministry of Defense) during the same period.

The main escape routes led to neighboring countries that could be entered without visas and relatively quickly. Kazakhstan became the primary destination, receiving tens – and later hundreds – of thousands of Russians. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, approximately 98,000 Russians crossed the border during the first week after mobilization began. By 4 October, the figure had reached around 200,000 Russians in Kazakhstan. Massive traffic jams formed at border checkpoints; media published images showing cars with Russian license plates stretching “as far as the eye could see.”

Georgia was another major destination, experiencing an unprecedented influx. At the only crossing point, Verkhniy Lars, car lines stretched over 30 kilometers. On 24 September, more than 8,500 Russian citizens entered Georgia in a single day – a 62% increase compared to the usual traffic. In total, 222,274 Russians crossed the Russian-Georgian border in September 2022 – a 511% increase compared to the same month of the previous year. According to Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, by the end of 2022, around 110,000 Russians remained in the country (some later moved onward or returned).

Other neighboring states also experienced a surge of Russian men fleeing mobilization. Finland, which was still allowing entry to Russian citizens holding valid visas in September 2022, saw a sharp increase in border crossings. On 24 September, Finnish authorities recorded a 62% rise in arrivals, and during the following week (26 September – 3 October) nearly 30,000 Russians entered the country, though about 18,000 of them later returned.

In early October 2022, Finland closed its borders to Russian tourists, but many had already managed to apply for asylum. According to the Finnish Immigration Service (Migri), at least 1,000 Russians – mostly young men – sought asylum in Finland due to their refusal to fight.¹⁴ The majority of these applications were filed in the autumn of 2022 (743 between September and December). However, Finnish authorities later began rejecting asylum claims on the grounds that draft evasion alone no longer justified protection, citing the end of the “active phase” of mobilization in Russia. Nevertheless, the very fact that around a thousand asylum applications were submitted illustrates the extent of the flight – even to distant countries such as Finland.

Central Asian countries also felt the impact of the influx of draft-age Russians avoiding mobilization. In the first days after the announcement, the number of flights and bus routes to Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan increased sharply, as many Russians chose these destinations for their visa-free entry. Although precise statistics for Central Asia are limited, it is known that in September 2022 alone, around 20,000 Russian citizens entered Kyrgyzstan (according to the national border service), and the trend continued through October.

Mongolia unexpectedly became a refuge for residents of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Media reports indicated that thousands of Russians crossed into Mongolia in the autumn of 2022, where volunteer groups in Ulaanbaatar established assistance centers for the new arrivals.

Outcome of the Third Wave

According to estimates, between late September and early October 2022, around 400,000 people fled Russia to escape mobilization. Some sources suggested even higher figures – up to 700,000, as reported by Forbes, citing Kremlin insiders – though Russian authorities officially denied these numbers. Even conservative estimates of 300,000–400,000 clearly indicate that the number of those who left exceeded the number of people mobilized, demonstrating that a significant portion of Russia’s draft-age male population preferred emigration over fighting in the war.

This wave had a distinctly gender- and age-specific profile: the majority of those fleeing were men aged 18 to 45, many of whom left hastily – sometimes with their families, sometimes in groups of friends. The geography of flight also expanded beyond neighboring states. Reports emerged of Russians fleeing “to the ends of the earth” – from individuals sailing by yacht to South Korea, to two men who crossed the Bering Strait by boat and sought asylum in Alaska, USA.

Main Destinations and Emigration Statistics
Below are summarized data on the number of Russian citizens who emigrated after the start of the war, focusing primarily on young people and men of conscription age:
Georgia:
According to official data from the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, 222,274 Russian citizens entered Georgia in September 2022 – six times more than during the same month a year earlier. By the end of 2022, around 100,000–110,000 Russian migrants remained in the country. Earlier, in March 2022, during the first month of the war, the inflow was estimated at about 25,000 people, reaching up to 100,000 by April (as local authorities anticipated a continued wave of arrivals).¹⁵ The massive influx of Russians led to a 210% increase in rental prices in Tbilisi over the year and sparked protests demanding the introduction of visa requirements for Russian citizens.
Kazakhstan:
According to statements by the Kazakh government, about 98,000 Russian citizens arrived in the country during the first week of mobilization (21–27 September 2022).¹⁶ By early October, the figure had exceeded 100,000, reaching as high as 200,000, according to some reports.¹⁷ President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev publicly declared that Kazakhstan would provide humanitarian assistance to Russians fleeing conscription, describing the situation as a “humanitarian issue.” Many arrivals applied for individual identification numbers (IINs) to be able to work legally: on 27 September 2022, service centers in Almaty were overcrowded with Russians queuing to obtain IINs. Later, a significant portion of the newcomers either returned home or moved onward to other destinations, and by the end of 2023, analysts estimated that around 100,000 Russian citizens remained in Kazakhstan as permanent residents.
Armenia:
Armenia became one of the first refuges for IT professionals and members of the creative class. By early April 2022, approximately 50,000 Russians had relocated to the country. This figure is comparable to the 1.7 million total tourists who visited Armenia in the first nine months of 2022, yet in this case, it reflected relocation rather than tourism. Russian arrivals opened more than 300 new companies and 20,000 bank accounts in Armenia. The inflow continued throughout autumn 2022; while precise figures are unavailable, indirect data suggest that by the end of the year tens of thousands of Russians had settled in Armenia, significantly increasing the population of Yerevan and other major cities.
Turkey:
Thanks to its visa-free regime with Russia and the absence of sanctions, Turkey attracted a large wave of emigrants. By April 2022, more than 100,000 Russians had arrived and applied for residence permits. Russian citizens became the largest group of foreign property buyers in Turkey in 2022, accounting for over 16% of all real estate purchases by foreigners – allowing many to legalize their stay through property ownership. Major settlement hubs included Istanbul and Antalya, with rapidly expanding Russian-speaking communities also emerging in Ankara and Izmir. Russian-language schools, cultural associations, and businesses catering to “new Russian” emigrants were established in Istanbul.
Serbia:
One of the few European countries that maintained friendly entry conditions for Russians. Serbia attracted IT companies and politically dissenting citizens due to its government’s neutrality and a visa-free 30-day entry policy. According to the Refugee Aid Center, between March and November 2022, about 104,000 Russian citizens registered their residence in Serbia.¹⁸ Many rented apartments in Belgrade and Novi Sad and opened businesses – according to the Serbian Business Register, Russians founded over 2,300 companies in 2022.¹⁹ In autumn 2022, at least 537 Russian children were enrolled in Serbian schools, showing that entire families relocated. Russian speech became commonplace in Belgrade’s streets, and a de facto “Russian district” emerged in New Belgrade.
Baltic States and Europe:

The Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) adopted a strict stance, restricting entry for Russian citizens with tourist visas in autumn 2022. However, before the closures, thousands of Russians crossed through Estonia. Meanwhile, Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, and others declared their readiness to accept Russian deserters and draft evaders, though only a few managed to reach the EU due to visa restrictions. According to Associated Press, during the first six months of the war, thousands of Russians applied for asylum in the U.S. and EU, including about 8,000 asylum applications in the United States between March and September 2022 – many through the Mexico border.

Israel:
The war led to a sharp rise in Jewish immigration (aliyah) from Russia. By October 2022, the number of immigrants from Russia had reached approximately 20,000 people (according to the Jewish Agency “Sokhnut”), more than three times higher than in the entire previous year. Among those who relocated were prominent cultural figures such as singer Alla Pugacheva and comedian Maksim Galkin, who settled in Israel. Israeli media described this migration as a “second great aliyah” from the former USSR.
Other Countries:

Hundreds of thousands of Russians dispersed to various other destinations. The United States and Canada accepted a limited number – primarily through the “Parole” program for relatives or via land routes (notably, the case of two Russians who reached Alaska by boat). The UAE (Dubai) became a new home for many wealthy Russians and celebrities – for example, rapper Morgenstern, who lived there after leaving Russia until his deportation. Other countries such as Montenegro, Cyprus, Thailand, Indonesia, and India also saw an influx of Russian relocants, although on a smaller scale. In Thailand, thousands of Russian IT specialists settled during 2022–2023, and there were high-profile cases of detentions and threats of deportation – such as the arrest of members of the rock band Bi-2 in Pattaya at Russia’s request. In Vietnam, several Russian opposition figures were expelled in 2023 following pressure from Moscow.

Refusal to Return and Long-Term Consequences

It is important to note that a significant portion of those who left do not plan to return to Russia until the war ends or the government changes. While some emigrants have struggled to settle abroad or faced hostility, the overwhelming majority have successfully established new lives. By the summer of 2023, only a limited number of repatriations had been recorded.

According to research by the Carnegie Endowment, approximately 1 million Russians left the country between 2022 and 2023 – less than 1% of the total population, but primarily representing the most active, educated, and skilled segments of society. The mass departure of young men is expected to have significant demographic and economic consequences for Russia: a worsening “brain drain,” a shrinking working-age population, and a decline in the IT sector. Demographers already describe the war and mobilization as a “second exodus” following the collapse of the USSR.

The emigration has also given rise to new Russian-speaking diasporas abroad. In Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan, communities of “new emigrants” have formed, establishing Russian-language schools, media outlets, and businesses. Many continue their oppositional activities from exile, maintaining a critical stance toward the war. At the same time, within Russia, state propaganda has branded those who left as “traitors” – according to surveys, 43% of Russians view emigrants as “betrayers of the homeland.”

Nevertheless, the trend of emigration persists: even in 2023, new spikes in departures were recorded, for example, amid rumors of a second wave of mobilization in spring 2023.

Conclusion:
Since the start of the war against Ukraine, Russia has experienced an unprecedented exodus of young men, primarily driven by political and military factors. Nothing comparable in scale occurred in the 2000s or 2010s; only the early 1990s, following the dissolution of the USSR, can be considered a distant parallel. However, the current emigration is fundamentally forced in nature – a flight from repression and war.

The first wave in spring 2022 was driven by shock at the invasion and the introduction of repressive laws; the second wave reflected a deliberate rejection of life in an isolated, wartime country; and the third wave represented a literal escape from conscription and potential death at the front.

Combined, the three waves are estimated to total between 500,000 and 1 million emigrants. This mass exodus of young and active Russians stands as one of the most significant social developments in modern Russia, directly linked to the outbreak of the 2022 war and its aftermath.

Sources and References:

• BBC News – “Russia faces a brain drain: thousands flee abroad” (13 March 2022) – report from Georgia about 25,000 newly arrived Russians and an estimated ~200,000 emigrants in the first weeks of the war. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=635iLwWdsU4

• Reuters / ARKA – “About 50,000 people relocate to Armenia” (7 April 2022) – interview with Armenia’s Minister of Economy about 50,000 relocants from Russia during March–early April.
https://arka.am/en/news/business/minister_some_50_000_people_relocate_to_armenia_/

• DW (Deutsche Welle) – “Who are the Russians leaving their country?” (5 April 2022) – analytical article describing the largest exodus since 1917: within five weeks, “hundreds of thousands, possibly more than a million” had left; new diasporas emerged in Georgia (100,000) and Armenia. https://www.dw.com/en/who-are-the-russians-leaving-their-country/a-61364390

• Thomson Reuters Foundation – “Russia’s war migrants find mixed reception in Georgia” (4 April 2022) – cites the OK Russians movement’s estimate of 300,000 emigrants by late March 2022, mostly young professionals. https://news.trust.org/item/20220401154740-zpmbl

• Newsweek – “Putin’s mobilization backfires: 370,000 Russians flee Russia in two weeks” (4 October 2022) – estimate of the exodus following the military draft. Data: 200,000 mobilized vs. ~370,000 who fled; 98,000 left for Kazakhstan in a week; 69,000 entered Georgia in ten days; 66,000 entered the EU in a week. https://www.newsweek.com/putin-mobilization-backfires-russians-flee-kazakhstan-georgia-eu-1748771

• Mixed Migration Centre – “How should Europe respond to Russians fleeing military mobilisation?” (October 2022) – after Putin’s announcement of mobilization on 21 September 2022 (about 300,000 conscripts), an estimated 400,000 or more Russians fled the country.
https://mixedmigration.org/how-should-europe-respond-russians-fleeing-military-mobilisation/

• Associated Press (via 9News Australia) – “Over 194,000 Russians flee call-up to neighboring countries” (27 September 2022) – data: 98,000 crossed into Kazakhstan in one week; over 53,000 entered Georgia during the same period; tens of thousands more fled to Finland, Mongolia, and elsewhere.
https://www.9news.com.au/world/russia-ukraine-nearly-200-000-russians-flee-country-after-vladimir-putin-conscription-order/d4660202-a1b0-4223-893e-2abaf4759fc9

• BBC (Serbian Service) – “Schools in Serbia – a new home for refugee children from Russia and Ukraine” (9 November 2022) – includes statistics: 104,000 Russians registered residence in Serbia between March and November 2022, as well as data on hundreds of Russian children enrolled in local schools. https://www.juznevesti.com/bbc-news-na-srpskom/rusija-i-ukrajina-skole-u-srbiji-privremeni-dom-ili-pocetak-novog-zivota-za-djake-izbegle-zbog-rata/.

• Satakieli (Finland) – “Finland has received around 1,000 asylum applications from Russians fleeing mobilization” (10 December 2024) – overview of the migration situation: approximately 1,000 asylum applications since spring 2022, of which 743 were filed in autumn 2022; notes Finland’s 2024 policy shift toward rejecting claims based on draft evasion.
https://satakieli.haaga-helia.fi/article/finland-has-started-issuing-negative-asylum-decisions-to-russians-fleeing-mobilization/

• The Moscow Times / AFP – “Record number of Russians moved to Finland in 2022” (24 May 2023) – official statistics: 6,003 Russians received residence permits in Finland in 2022 (the highest number since 1991), with Finnish authorities citing the war and mobilization as primary reasons. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/05/24/record-number-of-russians-moved-to-finland-in-2022-a81268

The listed materials include links to primary sources for further reference.
Taken together, this body of evidence clearly demonstrates that the mass emigration of young Russian men began only after the start of the war in 2022. Nothing comparable in scale had ever been recorded before. Young Russians chose emigration over an uncertain future in a country at war and under authoritarian rule – a phenomenon widely reported in international media and corroborated by statistical data.

1 https://www.dw.com/en/who-are-the-russians-leaving-their-country/a-61364390#:~:text=04%2F05%2F2022%20April%205%2C%202022

2 https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/05/24/record–number–of–russians–moved–to–finland–in-2022-a81268