Lithuanian Court Practice in Cases Concerning “Threats to National Security” (2022–2025)

Lithuanian courts overwhelmingly uphold secret security rulings against Belarusians and Russians, relying on classified evidence and uniform judgments.

This report examines how Lithuania’s administrative courts handle cases in which foreign nationals—primarily from Belarus and Russia—are denied residence, expelled, or labelled a “threat to national security” based on secret conclusions of the State Security Department (VSD). Through statistical, linguistic, and legal analysis of 101 rulings issued between 2022 and 2025, the study reveals a system dominated by formalism, opacity, and near-automatic confirmation of security-service assessments. The findings show a judiciary that rarely evaluates evidence independently, relies heavily on template language, and applies sanctions uniformly, often without considering family circumstances, proportionality, or individual history.

Summary

• 73% of complaints were dismissed;

• The average entry ban duration – 4.2 years (almost always standardized to 5 years);

• 285 days – the average waiting time between the VSD decision and the court ruling;

• 95% of cases rely on a classified VSD conclusion that cannot be accessed;

• Military service, even 23 years ago – 100% refusal rate;

• The “national security threat” category is also applied to family members (spouses, children);

• None of the court rulings contain the terms “įrodyta” (“proven”), “faktiškai patvirtinta” (“factually confirmed”), or “remiantis faktais” (“based on facts”);

• 94% of rulings employ substitute formulations such as “galimai kelia grėsmę” (“may pose a threat”);

• 93.5% of decisions are syntactically identical;

• Only 6% contain unique formulations;

• Instead of gathering and examining evidence, courts cite themselves (“such is the judicial practice”).

I. Introduction

Object of Analysis:
Administrative court rulings in Lithuania concerning cases where foreign nationals (mainly citizens of Belarus and Russia) were denied residence permits, political asylum, or extension of legal status, or where expulsion/deportation decisions were made on the basis of the conclusions of the State Security Department (VSD – Valstybės saugumo departamentas) regarding a “threat to national security.”

Period Covered:
2022–2025 (the practice intensified after the Russia–Ukraine war and Belarus’s role in so-called “hybrid threats,” as noted in EU documents).

Total number of rulings analyzed: 101;
Full data sourced from LITEKO – Lietuvos teismų informacinė sistema (https://liteko.teismai.lt/).

II. Methodology

Unit of Analysis: Judicial decision (administrative ruling).

Sources: Regional Administrative Courts and the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania (LVAT – Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas).

Methods:
Content analysis, quantitative and linguistic evaluation, formula recurrence testing, and analysis of judicial composition.

Main criteria of violations considered during analysis:

• Formalism and lack of individual assessment – violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – right to a fair trial;

• Disregard for applicant’s evidence – violation of Article 13 ECHR – right to an effective remedy;

• Opacity of VSD conclusions – violation of Article 6 ECHR – equality of arms;

• Discrimination by nationality – violation of Article 14 ECHR;

• Disproportionality of measures – violation of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

• Factual inaccuracies and distortions – violation of Article 8 ECHR – right to respect for private and family life.

III. Statistical Overview

Findings:

• The asymmetry is significant: 72.3% dismissals indicate VSD priority, yet 27.7% partial or full successes occur in cases involving family in Lithuania, long-term residence (≥15 years), or procedural errors (eA-1498-822/2024, eA-1809-556/2024).

• The standard sanction of 5 years dominates (68%), though SIS listings are lifted for family reasons (e.g., eA-1476-525/2025, eA-1598-556/2025), whereas eA-1498-822/2024 resulted in only 2 years – a rare example of individualization.

• SIS inclusion often lacks justification (e.g., eA-1476-525/2025) – potentially disproportionate under Article 8 ECHR.

• Speed: average 285-day gap between VSD and court – formally sufficient, but 94% of rulings replicate VSD texts by more than 50% (n=62).

• Selectivity: BY 51.5% / RU 47.5% balance – but 100% denials for any past military service (even 23 years ago), indicating possible nationality-based discrimination (Article 14 ECHR).

• Conclusion: High refusal rates and uniform sanctions imply a systemic approach. The 27.7% success rate in family or humanitarian cases shows that judicial review operates only in exceptional situations.

IV. Yearly Dynamics

Interpretation:
The average lag between a VSD (State Security Department) conclusion and a court decision is 285 days, which corresponds to roughly 9.5 months.
This time is formally sufficient for evidentiary review; however, 94% of court texts coincide with VSD conclusions by over 50%.

While courts occasionally assess individual circumstances (family, health, remoteness of events), this only results in 27.7% positive outcomes.
Median delay – 180 days – shows the process is not purely conveyor-style, yet 92% of rulings use templated formulations, and only 8 out of 101 contain unique wording.

V. Judicial Conveyor: Speed and Formalism

• 68% of cases were decided within 6–12 months after the VSD conclusion.

• In 94% of rulings, the court text overlaps with VSD phrasing by more than 50% (n=62).

• 8 cases required review (e.g., Case #99 – audio recording without translation).

• 7 resulted in full victories for applicants (e.g., Case #86 – secret service involvement 27 years ago).

• The average length of the reasoning section: 3–5 pages.

• Individualization present in only 27.7% of cases.

Interpretation:
These data indicate mechanical confirmation of security service conclusions by the courts.
Judicial review exists only formally — in practice, it functions as administrative endorsement rather than independent control.

VI. Violations under Six Criteria

Systemic Violations:
In 72.3% of cases, courts fail to balance public and individual interests, while in only 27.7% they do (e.g., Cases #86, #93).

Overall finding:
These indicators confirm a systemic refusal of judicial control, turning the courts into a mechanism for approving security service conclusions rather than an independent branch of justice.

VII. Judicial Composition

Interpretation:
Approximately 60% of all cases are concentrated among the top judicial panels.
This reflects a high level of standardization and predictability of outcomes.
Victories for applicants generally occur only when humanitarian factors (e.g., family ties, health, or long-term residence) are present.

VIII. Typology of “Threats”

Statistical details:

• Average remoteness of such “threat-related” facts – 14.8 years (n=62).

• Over 93.5% (58/62) of rulings reproduce VSD language by more than 50%.

• Recognition of opposition activity or humanitarian arguments occurs only in 12.9% (13/101) of cases – and typically when family ties in Lithuania exist.

• Assessment of proportionality appears in 11.9% (12/101) – again mainly when SIS listings were lifted due to family circumstances.

• Military service = 100% refusal, even if 27 years prior, unless accompanied by strong family or health factors.

Pattern:
All rulings rely exclusively on VSD memoranda, without independent verification of facts or disclosure of evidence.
Courts treat any “study in a military academy,” “service,” or “employment” in the former USSR, Belarusian, or Russian structures (since 1989) as sufficient grounds for labeling the person a “threat,” irrespective of actual duties.

Arguments related to anti-war stance, volunteering, participation in protests, integration, family life, employment, human rights or civic activism, or support for Ukraine are systematically deemed “nereikšmingi aplinkybės” – irrelevant circumstances.

A five-year entry ban is applied automatically; proportionality is never assessed.
Since 2024, the “threat” category has been extended to family members (spouses, children).

Courts operate on the presumption of the VSD’s reliability:

“Teismas neturi pagrindo nesutikti su VSD išvada” – The court has no grounds to disagree with the VSD conclusion.

No factual verification is performed; counter-evidence is ignored.
The structure of judgments is fully standardized:

1. Restatement of the applicant’s claim;

2. Paraphrased extract from the VSD report;

3. Reference to Article 50(1)(14) of the Law on Foreigners;

4. Formulaic conclusion: “kelia grėsmę valstybės saugumui” – poses a threat to state security.

Thus, a biographical model of threat has been formed – mere citizenship of Belarus or Russia or prior work in their institutions automatically implies a national security risk.

This typology turns the “threat” category into a universal exclusion tool for unwanted foreigners, without evidentiary basis or judicial control, effectively replacing the presumption of innocence with a presumption of threat.

IX. Linguistic and Legal Analysis of Judgments

Main recurring formulas:

1. “Teismas neturi pagrindo nesutikti su VSD išvada” → 95%.
   → The court has no grounds to disagree with the VSD conclusion (or: The court finds no reason to challenge the VSD assessment).

2. “Atliekamas perspektyvinis vertinimas” → 92%.
   → A prospective (predictive) assessment is carried out.
   (Legal meaning: the court evaluates potential, not actual, future threat.)

3. “Pareiškėjo gyvenimas kelia grėsmę valstybės saugumui” → 88%.
   → The applicant’s life poses a threat to national security.

These three expressions constitute the core clichés of Lithuanian administrative rulings in national security–related cases.

• The first removes responsibility from the court – automatic trust and endorsement of VSD conclusions.

• The second legitimizes forecasting of hypothetical threats without factual proof.

• The third replaces legal reasoning with declarative assertion.

Across all 101 decisions:

• Not a single one contains the words “įrodyta” (proven), “faktiškai patvirtinta” (factually confirmed), “remiantis faktais” (based on facts), or “įvertinus visus įrodymus” (having assessed all evidence).

• Instead, 94% use evidentiary substitution formulas:

  • “galimai kelia grėsmę” (may pose a threat),

  • “potencialiai kelia grėsmę” (potentially poses a threat),

  • “atliekamas perspektyvinis vertinimas” (a prospective assessment is carried out).

• 93.5% of texts are syntactically identical.

• Only 6% contain any unique language.

Interpretation:
The linguistic uniformity of rulings functions as an indicator of institutional self-censorship.
The judicial text legally codifies the presumption of threat rather than establishing facts or examining evidence.

From a legal standpoint, the courts do not claim that the threat is proven, but merely that it is possible or predicted.
This shifts judicial reasoning from the realm of facts to the realm of assumptions, rendering substantive appeal or review impossible.

Closed “precedent” and circular verification:

• Mechanism: courts reproduce phrases from prior “national security” judgments and cite them as sufficient precedent, without verifying current facts.

• Role of LVAT: the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania consolidates template theses – e.g., the competence of VSD, “prospective assessment,” and priority of abstract security over individual rights – which lower courts then replicate.

• Effect: the system forms a self-referential loop – a threat is considered “confirmed” simply because it has been affirmed before, without factual examination.

Consequences for the standard of proof:
Shift from “proven” to “assumed / predicted.”
Facts of the case lose relevance.

Consequences for legal remedies:
Applicants are deprived of any effective means of rebutting the presumption of threat, since courts rely on their own prior formulas.

Thus, Lithuanian courts have created and perpetuate a closed precedent system: instead of fact-finding, they cite previous identical rulings, thereby legitimizing VSD conclusions in a circular fashion and pushing the evidentiary standard beyond factual verification.

X. Legal and Institutional Consequences

A comprehensive statistical and textual analysis of judicial decisions confirms that the handling of “national security” cases in Lithuania exceeds the permissible boundaries of both constitutional and European law.
A distinct quasi-judicial subsystem has formed – functioning outside the fundamental principles of fair trial, equality of arms, and judicial independence.

1. Violations of Key Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

Article 6 – Right to a Fair Trial
The courts do not perform their essential role of examining evidence and facts.
They merely endorse the conclusions of the State Security Department (VSD).
There is no public hearing, independent expertise, or opportunity for the parties to be examined or to cross-examine.
Decisions are often rendered within 20-30 days, which precludes substantive fact-finding.
This constitutes a de facto denial of judicial control.

Article 8 – Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
Residence permits (leidimas gyventi) and entry bans are revoked without assessing their impact on the applicant’s family, children, or long-term social integration.
Even after 10+ years of residence and active integration into Lithuanian society, courts routinely classify such circumstances as “nereikšmingi” (insignificant).

Article 13 – Right to an Effective Remedy
Given that 72.3% of complaints are dismissed and courts do not require VSD to disclose evidence, no effective remedy exists in practice.
The judicial process becomes imitative rather than corrective.

Article 14 – Prohibition of Discrimination
The application of the “threat” category exclusively to citizens of Belarus and Russia (BY 51.5% / RU 47.5%) constitutes systematic discrimination based on origin.
Nationality and biography are used as independent criteria for assessing threat — contrary to the principles of equality before the law.

2. Violations of the Law of the European Union

Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to an Effective Judicial Remedy
Lithuanian courts fail to ensure impartial adjudication.
They do not evaluate evidence or the proportionality of restrictive measures.
VSD conclusions are perceived as acts of supreme authority, beyond judicial scrutiny — incompatible with judicial autonomy.

Article 52(1) of the Charter – Principle of Proportionality
Restrictions on residence rights must be necessary and proportionate.
However, Lithuanian courts do not apply the proportionality test; they automatically approve the five-year bans.
As a result, the balance between public security and individual rights has been effectively eliminated.

3. Systemic and International Implications

Potential for a Pattern or Structural Case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
The combination of factors – identical judgment structures, absence of factual verification, 72.3% dismissal rate, and ethnic selectivity – indicates a structural violation pattern.
This opens grounds for a collective or pilot complaint on behalf of affected persons.

Grounds for Monitoring by the European Commission (Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union)
Systemic dependence of the judiciary on security agencies may qualify as a threat to the rule of law.
The practice contradicts both Venice Commission recommendations and the European Commission’s Rule of Law Reports.

Institutional Risks
Continued adherence to this practice may erode trust among European and international partners, including UNHCR and ODIHR.
These institutions could classify such conduct as a systemic breach of the right to asylum and protection against arbitrary expulsion (non-refoulement).

Institutional Conclusion

The cumulative evidence – 94% overlap between court reasoning and VSD conclusions in approximately 101 administrative “national security” cases, uniform wording, short processing times, absence of evidentiary review, and ethnic selectivity — points to functional dependency of the judiciary on the executive (security services).

In effect, Lithuania’s judicial system has lost the hallmarks of institutional independence in matters of national security.
Courts act as administrative ratification bodies, not as independent checks on state authority.
This undermines the separation of powers and erodes public trust in the institution of justice in Lithuania as a whole.

XI. Recommendations

1. Oblige the State Security Department (VSD) to disclose non-classified evidence (Article 6 ECHR).

2. Introduce proportionality testing in national security cases (Article 52(1) EU Charter).

3. Provide judicial training on the rights of migrants and asylum seekers.

4. Establish independent review mechanisms for national security cases (Article 13 ECHR).

5. Eliminate nationality-based selectivity (Article 14 ECHR).

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Darko Kalinowski

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