Closing Equality Gaps: Lessons from Lithuania for Reviving the Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive

Lithuania reveals why stronger EU equality law requires independent implementation and accountability mechanisms.

Addressing Structural and Intersectional Discrimination

Policy Brief

Our House Centre for Human Rights and Relief

1. Executive Summary

The Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive represents a critical opportunity to modernise EU equality law and close persistent protection gaps. While existing legislation offers important safeguards, practice in Lithuania demonstrates how structural and intersectional discrimination emerges through the interaction of political narratives, restrictive legislation, administrative practice and insufficient oversight.

Structural discrimination rarely stems from a single unlawful decision. It develops incrementally when exclusionary rhetoric shapes law and administration, creating cumulative barriers across residence, family reunification, banking, funding and civic space. Lithuania — one of the lowest-ranked EU countries in the 2025 MIPEX index (37/100) — illustrates this dynamic clearly: despite significant inflows of Belarusian migrants and refugees, the country experienced substantial secondary emigration (escape coefficient ~1.89 in 2024), widespread security-based classifications, and administrative spillover that affects both individuals and organisations.

Administrative spillover refers to situations in which adverse administrative consequences imposed on one individual are subsequently extended to independent legal entities, funding decisions or financial services without an independent assessment of those entities themselves.

The experience of Our House Centre for Human Rights and Relief further illustrates these dynamics. While documenting structural discrimination and providing humanitarian assistance, the organisation itself became a documented target of transnational repression and cumulative administrative restrictions despite the absence of any judicial finding of unlawful conduct. This experience highlights a broader EU vulnerability: democratic watchdog organisations exposing structural problems inside Member States often lack effective protection.

Key recommendation: Revive and strengthen the Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive with explicit provisions on structural and cumulative discrimination, and establish an Independent European Mechanism (e.g. Special Rapporteur) on Transnational Repression, Structural Discrimination and Administrative Accountability.

Closing equality gaps requires more than new legislation. It demands recognition of how structural discrimination develops and robust institutional safeguards to ensure effective implementation across the EU.

2. Why the Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive Matters Today

Discrimination in the European Union has evolved. Traditional forms of unequal treatment are increasingly supplemented by structural and intersectional barriers arising through administrative practices, migration control, financial restrictions, security measures and digital tools. These barriers often disproportionately affect refugees, migrants, human rights defenders, journalists and political exiles.

The Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive is essential because it would extend protection against discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation beyond employment — closing the current hierarchy of grounds and addressing gaps in social protection, education, goods and services. Recent developments, including the European Parliament’s Resolution of 16 June 2026 on countering transnational repression, underscore that administrative, financial and legal systems can themselves become instruments of exclusion rather than protection.

Effective equality protection depends as much on implementation as on legislation. Excessive formalism, fragmented responsibilities and limited supervisory scrutiny weaken the practical enforcement of EU rights. Transparent decision-making, individual assessment, access to evidence and compliance with Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights are therefore indispensable.

3. Lithuania as a Case Study: How Structural Discrimination Develops in Practice

Lithuania demonstrates that structural discrimination does not require overtly discriminatory laws. It emerges when political narratives, legislation, administrative practice and weak oversight reinforce one another.

3.1 Political Narratives Transform Equality into Security

Since 2022, migration, asylum and Belarusian political exile have increasingly been framed primarily as national security issues rather than questions of international protection and human rights. Public rhetoric has progressively portrayed Belarusian nationals as a collective risk rather than individuals deserving individual assessment.

The demographic consequences are measurable. Between 2019 and 2024 approximately 77,000 Belarusian citizens arrived in Lithuania. Yet by 1 January 2025 only 57,500 remained. In 2024 alone the population declined significantly despite continued arrivals, producing an escape coefficient of ~1.89. Rather than a country of durable protection, these figures indicate substantial secondary onward migration. More than 2,000 Belarusian nationals have reportedly been classified as national security threats. At the same time, publicly available information indicates very few criminal prosecutions involving espionage by Belarusian citizens, raising broader questions regarding proportionality, evidentiary standards and the relationship between individual criminal liability and administrative security classifications.

3.2 Restrictive Legislation Expands Administrative Discretion

Political narratives have been translated into successive legislative restrictions: limitations on residence permits, family reunification, enhanced security screening and repeated extensions of restrictive measures. Although formally justified by national security, these measures substantially expand administrative discretion and reduce practical access to rights.

Independent indicators confirm the impact. According to the 2025 MIPEX index Lithuania ranks second from last in the EU (37/100 overall), with particularly low scores in political participation (5/100), access to citizenship (22/100), healthcare (31/100) and family reunification (43/100). Restrictive policies now affect not only entry but long-term integration and equal participation in society.

3.3 Administrative Practice: From Fact-Finding to Construction of Facts

The most significant shift occurs at the administrative level. In certain documented cases authorities appear to move beyond evaluating evidence: they first construct factual or political propositions not advanced by the applicant, then evaluate those propositions, and finally rely on their own construction to reject the claim.

One asylum decision is particularly illustrative. The authority concluded that no evidence of public support for Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya had been found and questioned the sincerity of such support — despite the fact that refugee law contains no requirement to support any particular political figure, express such support publicly, or demonstrate ideological loyalty. International refugee law requires assessment of persecution risk, not political conformity.

This methodological problem is reinforced by quantitative evidence. Analysis of 101 administrative court judgments on alleged national security threats reveals a highly standardised approach: 73% of complaints dismissed, average entry ban of 4.2 years, 95% reliance on classified VSD assessments, 94% use of speculative formulations (“may pose a threat”), and 93.5% substantially identical reasoning. Individual fact-finding is increasingly replaced by predictive assumptions and limited judicial scrutiny.

3.4 Administrative Spillover and Financial Exclusion

Security classifications frequently produce consequences far beyond migration status. A label imposed on an individual can spill over to independent legal entities — for example, resulting in exclusion from Erasmus+ and other EU funding programmes without any finding of violation by the organisation itself. Debanking, enhanced compliance procedures and barriers to financial services further transform administrative decisions into comprehensive restrictions on civic, professional and humanitarian activity.

3.5 Measurable Outcomes

The evidence presented above demonstrates that structural discrimination produces consequences extending far beyond individual administrative decisions.

Its effects are observable simultaneously in demographic trends, migrant integration, access to fundamental rights, humanitarian action and the functioning of civil society. Rather than remaining confined to asylum or migration procedures, cumulative administrative restrictions progressively affect long-term integration, family life, access to financial services, organisational sustainability and democratic participation.

These outcomes are also intersectional. Women whose residence status depends on family reunification face disproportionate legal insecurity, while human rights defenders, journalists and democratic watchdog organisations experience cumulative administrative barriers, financial exclusion, intimidation and restrictions affecting their ability to operate.

The Lithuanian case therefore demonstrates that structural discrimination should be assessed not only through the legality of individual decisions but also through their cumulative impact on equality, democratic participation, institutional resilience and the effective protection of fundamental rights.

3.6 Lithuania Illustrates a European Rule-of-Law Gap

The Lithuanian case shows that structural discrimination can become institutionalised without any single overtly discriminatory law. Legislative reform alone — even a strengthened Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive — will remain only partially effective without independent oversight capable of identifying recurring administrative methodologies and ensuring implementation.

3.7 Human Rights Organisations as Democratic Watchdogs: A Critical Protection Gap in Lithuania

European Union institutions increasingly recognise the essential role of individual human rights defenders in safeguarding democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. Considerably less attention, however, has been devoted to protecting human rights organisations performing democratic watchdog functions, particularly organisations operating in exile while documenting structural shortcomings within Member States themselves.

Our House Centre for Human Rights and Relief illustrates this protection gap. For more than twenty years, the organisation has documented militarisation, conscientious objection, transnational repression, discrimination, asylum practice and restrictions affecting civil society, while providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and supporting victims of political persecution. Between 2022 and 2025, Our House organised 20 humanitarian convoys, each carrying approximately 15 tonnes of humanitarian aid.

Our House therefore serves not only as the author of this Policy Brief but also as an empirical case illustrating how democratic watchdog organisations may themselves become targets of cumulative administrative discrimination, transnational repression and institutional protection gaps while documenting structural shortcomings within the European Union.

This Policy Brief therefore combines institutional analysis with an empirically documented case demonstrating how democratic watchdog organisations may themselves become affected by the structural discrimination they seek to expose.

This is not merely an allegation. Lithuanian courts established that Belarusian KGB espionage operations targeted Our House, its staff, volunteers, humanitarian activities and beneficiaries. The conviction of Lithuanian citizen Mantas Daniėlius for espionage on behalf of the Belarusian KGB confirmed that the organisation had become an operational target of a foreign authoritarian regime because of its humanitarian work and democratic watchdog activities.

This judicial finding should have triggered not only criminal accountability but also an institutional protection response. Once public authorities become aware that an organisation performing an essential public-interest function faces a documented security threat, they have positive obligations to assess continuing risks, establish structured cooperation, adopt reasonable preventive measures and ensure that the organisation can continue its lawful activities without unnecessary interference.

However, no such institutional response emerged:

no comprehensive protection strategy was developed for Our House;
no structured assessment of continuing security risks was carried out;
no permanent framework for cooperation between public authorities and the organisation was established;
no preventive mechanism was introduced to reduce the risk of similar attacks against organisations working with refugees, political exiles and victims of authoritarian regimes.

Instead of receiving enhanced institutional protection, Our House continued to experience cumulative administrative and financial restrictions despite the absence of any judicial finding that the organisation itself had engaged in unlawful conduct. These included administrative spillover, restrictions affecting banking and financial services, debanking, prolonged compliance procedures, exclusion from funding opportunities, reputational attacks, disinformation campaigns and increasing administrative barriers affecting humanitarian work.

These measures did not operate independently. Financial exclusion functioned as an administrative multiplier, transforming administrative classifications into operational restrictions affecting fundraising, salaries, humanitarian assistance, organisational sustainability and participation in European programmes. Debanking should therefore not be understood merely as a banking issue but as one of the mechanisms through which cumulative administrative discrimination is translated into practical exclusion.

The issue is therefore not limited to espionage. It concerns the absence of an institutional model capable of protecting democratic watchdog organisations after a documented security threat has been identified. As a result, a democratic watchdog organisation became simultaneously the target of a foreign intelligence service, the subject of cumulative administrative and financial restrictions, and an organisation expected to continue monitoring human rights violations without any dedicated institutional protection.

The Lithuanian experience demonstrates that protecting individual human rights defenders is no longer sufficient. Democratic watchdog organisations investigate governmental conduct, document structural discrimination, provide evidence to European institutions and strengthen democratic accountability. When such organisations become targets of foreign intelligence services while simultaneously facing administrative retaliation and financial exclusion, the capacity of democratic institutions themselves to identify systemic failures and ensure accountability is weakened.

Protecting democratic watchdog organisations is therefore not simply a matter of supporting civil society. It is a prerequisite for safeguarding democracy, effective human rights monitoring and the rule of law within the European Union. The revision of the Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive should therefore be accompanied by explicit safeguards for democratic watchdog organisations and by an Independent European Mechanism on Transnational Repression, Structural Discrimination and Administrative Accountability capable of monitoring systemic patterns, ensuring effective protection and preventing institutional retaliation against organisations exposing structural violations.

4. Lessons from Lithuania for European Equality Law

The Lithuanian experience demonstrates that structural and intersectional discrimination can develop within an EU Member State without any single law expressly authorising unequal treatment. Rather, discrimination emerges incrementally through the interaction of political narratives, restrictive legislation, administrative methodologies, financial exclusion and insufficient institutional oversight.

The case therefore offers broader lessons for the future development of European equality law.

First, structural discrimination develops cumulatively rather than through isolated unlawful decisions. Existing equality frameworks remain primarily designed to address individual acts of discrimination. The Lithuanian experience demonstrates that systemic exclusion may instead arise from the combined effect of multiple legally distinct administrative measures, each appearing lawful when examined separately but producing discriminatory outcomes when operating together.

Second, national security powers require stronger procedural safeguards. National security remains a legitimate objective. However, reliance on classified evidence, predictive assessments, ideological criteria and limited judicial scrutiny creates a significant risk that security considerations gradually replace individualised assessment and equal treatment. Effective procedural guarantees are therefore essential to preserve both security and fundamental rights.

Third, administrative methodologies themselves may become sources of structural discrimination. The Lithuanian case illustrates that structural discrimination may arise not only from unlawful legislation but also from recurring administrative methodologies, including the construction of facts not relied upon by applicants, speculative reasoning and standardised decision-making that limits genuine individual assessment. European equality law should therefore address administrative practices as well as legislative measures.

Fourth, democratic watchdog organisations require explicit institutional protection. Organisations documenting structural discrimination, transnational repression and rule-of-law deficiencies perform an essential public function within democratic societies. When such organisations become targets of foreign intelligence services while simultaneously facing cumulative administrative restrictions, financial exclusion or institutional retaliation, the ability of European institutions to identify systemic violations is itself weakened. Protecting democratic watchdog organisations should therefore be recognised as a rule-of-law requirement rather than merely a civil society policy objective.

Fifth, stronger legislation must be accompanied by stronger implementation mechanisms. Even a strengthened Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive will remain only partially effective if structural discrimination cannot be identified before it becomes embedded within ordinary administrative practice. Effective implementation therefore requires independent European monitoring capable of detecting recurring administrative patterns, ensuring accountability across Member States and protecting individuals and organisations exposing systemic violations.

The Lithuanian experience therefore demonstrates that closing equality gaps requires both stronger substantive legislation and stronger institutional safeguards. Reviving the Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive should be accompanied by an Independent European Mechanism on Transnational Repression, Structural Discrimination and Administrative Accountability capable of monitoring implementation, identifying systemic risks and ensuring that equality guarantees remain effective in practice rather than only in law.

5. Recommendations

The European Parliament should:

Prioritise the adoption of a strengthened Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive explicitly recognising structural, cumulative, intersectional and administrative forms of discrimination, including discrimination arising through the combined effects of multiple administrative measures.
Support the establishment of an Independent European Mechanism (such as a European Special Rapporteur or an equivalent permanent body) on Transnational Repression, Structural Discrimination and Administrative Accountability, with an explicit mandate to monitor the protection of democratic watchdog organisations.
Recognise democratic watchdog organisations as essential actors of the European rule-of-law framework and promote legislative safeguards protecting them from cumulative administrative discrimination, financial exclusion, institutional retaliation and documented transnational repression.
Request regular implementation reviews and dedicated LIBE hearings examining how national security measures affect equality rights, asylum procedures, civil society organisations and compliance with EU fundamental rights standards.

The European Commission should:

Develop implementation guidelines clarifying that asylum and migration decisions must be based on individual assessment and objective evidence, and that ideological loyalty tests, collective risk presumptions and extra-legal political criteria are incompatible with EU law and international refugee protection standards.
Monitor structural discrimination as a rule-of-law issue, including administrative spillover, debanking, financial exclusion, cumulative administrative restrictions and other practices capable of producing systemic discrimination.
Integrate structural discrimination and administrative accountability into the Annual Rule of Law Report, identifying recurring administrative methodologies that undermine equality guarantees.
Develop minimum European standards for institutional cooperation with democratic watchdog organisations exposed to documented transnational repression, including preventive protection measures following confirmed security incidents.

Member States should:

Ensure genuinely individualised decision-making in national security, asylum and migration procedures, guaranteeing access to evidence, effective judicial review and full compliance with Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Prohibit automatic administrative spillover, ensuring that security-related decisions concerning individuals cannot produce adverse consequences for independent organisations, funding decisions or access to financial services without a separate and individualised legal assessment.
Establish institutional protection protocols for democratic watchdog organisations and human rights organisations facing documented transnational repression, including structured security cooperation, preventive risk assessment and coordinated responses following confirmed foreign intelligence operations.
Recognise financial exclusion as a potential equality and rule-of-law issue, ensuring that debanking, enhanced compliance measures and restrictions affecting access to financial services remain subject to effective oversight, transparency and legal remedies.

Conclusion

The future of European equality law depends not only on stronger legislation but also on the capacity of European institutions to identify structural discrimination before it becomes embedded within ordinary administrative practice.

Protecting democratic watchdog organisations should be recognised as an integral component of the European rule-of-law architecture rather than solely as a matter of civil society policy.

Without effective implementation, independent monitoring and institutional safeguards, structural discrimination may progressively become normalised within ordinary administrative practice before either national or European institutions are able to identify, prevent and remedy its cumulative effects.