Between the Promise of Asylum and the Practice of Expulsion: Lithuania’s Humanitarian Paradox for Belarusians

Lithuania calls itself a safe haven for Belarusians, yet 2019–2025 data show rising refusals and net exits—turning asylum promises into quiet expulsion.

Statistical Data and Trends (2019–2025)

Summary
The public rhetoric of Lithuanian authorities and officials presents Lithuania as “the safest haven” and “the most welcoming and attractive EU country” for Belarusians fleeing political and military threats.¹ ² ³ ⁴.

Statistical data for the period 2019–2025 demonstrate the exact opposite: a stable expulsion pattern is emerging, leading to secondary re-emigration of Belarusians from Lithuania to other EU countries and beyond the Schengen area⁵.

These figures indicate the existence of an informal policy of pushing Belarusians out of Lithuania.

This report provides annual statistical tables (inflows, stock data, and “escape coefficients,” as well as the dynamics of asylum applications and grants of international protection) for independent verification, public discussion of the real situation of Belarusians in Lithuania, and replication of the findings.

At the same time, no official court cases or criminal proceedings publicly registered against citizens of Belarus in Lithuania on charges of “acting in favor of Belarus or Russia” (espionage, intelligence activity) have been identified. Despite extensive rhetoric by Lithuanian authorities linking Belarusians to threats to national security, no such criminal cases exist in open sources.

The assessment and conclusions of this report are based on reconciling annual inflow data for Belarusians (immigration by citizenship) with stock indicators (the number of Belarusians actually residing in Lithuania as of a given date).

The total inflow of Belarusian citizens to Lithuania between 2019 and 2024 is estimated at around 77,000 persons, while the number of Belarusians actually residing in the country as of 1 January 2025 stands at 57,500. This discrepancy is explained by secondary re-emigration and informal administrative push-out mechanisms. In 2024, nearly two Belarusians left Lithuania for every one who arrived (escape coefficient ≈ 1.89), and the total number of residents dropped from over 62,000 to 57,500 within a year.

Following the record inflow of Belarusians fleeing war and repression, 2022–2023 marked a reversal toward net outflow. The shift to a persistent negative balance has been accompanied by retroactive screening of Belarusians as a “risk category,” a rise in refusals and non-renewals on the grounds of “national security threat,” a narrowing of practical access to asylum and legal assistance at the border, linguistic and ideological pressure, and hostility in public discourse.

The declared image of Lithuania as a “safe haven” for Belarusians is not supported by demographic balance: in reality, Lithuania functions as a transit hub and a source of secondary re-emigration.

By the combined indicators of 2023–2024, Lithuania has become one of the most toxic EU jurisdictions for Belarusian refugees: growth has turned into expulsion, the “gates of protection” have narrowed, and integration has been replaced by deterrence.

1) Immigration flows of Belarusian citizens to Lithuania (annual inflow)

Year	Belarusians arrived	Source
2018	3257	Migration Yearbook 2018 — table by citizenship (row: Baltarusijos)⁶
2019	6388	Migration Yearbook 2019 — table by citizenship (row: Baltarusijos)⁷.
2020	7279	Migration Yearbook 2020 — table by citizenship⁸.
2021	8287	Migration Yearbook 2021 — table by citizenship⁹ ¹⁰.
2022	9789	Migration Yearbook 2022 — table by citizenship¹¹¹² ¹³.
2023	15675	Migration Yearbook 2023 — table by citizenship¹⁴ ¹⁵.
2024	5229	Migration Yearbook 2024 (EN), table “Number of foreigners who came to live… by citizenship in 2024: Belarus – 5,229”¹⁶.

Methodologically, these are flows (annual arrivals), not the number of residents¹⁷.

Only the “stock” figure as of 1 January 2025 is available: 57.5 thousand citizens of Belarus reside in Lithuania (a stock, not a flow).

Official source: Migration Department of Lithuania – “Latest Migration Yearbook: Key Statistics.”¹⁸

The paradox of the dynamics of annual migration flows of Belarusians to Lithuania clearly demonstrates that the main waves of Belarusian migration to Lithuania did not occur during the period of mass political repression in 2020, but rather in the years following the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022, and consisted mainly of Belarusian citizens who did not support Russia’s aggression.

In 2020–2021, when the scale of repression inside Belarus reached its peak, only about 15,560 people arrived in Lithuania in total over two years.

In 2022–2023, amid fears of mobilization, militarization, and growing anxiety about possible involvement in the war, the inflow increased by more than 1.5 times, reaching 25,464 persons over two years.

Thus, the motivation for relocation shifted from seeking political asylum to avoiding participation in Russia’s military actions against Ukraine.

This shift is confirmed not only by absolute numbers but also by the content of asylum applications, where the share of claims referring to anti-war positions and refusal of mobilization or military service in the Belarusian army has risen sharply.

Statistically, Lithuania has become for Belarusians more of a transit country and a temporary shelter from the war, rather than a stable and safe refuge for political and anti-war refugees from Belarus.

Table 2. Number of Belarusian citizens residing in Lithuania (“stock”)

Date	Number of Belarusians residing in Lithuania	Source
01.01.2019	12,204	2019 Migration Yearbook (MIGRACIJOS METRAŠTIS 2019)¹⁹
01.01.2020	17,769	2020 Migration Yearbook (MIGRACIJOS METRAŠTIS 2020)²⁰
01.01.2021	23,440	2021 Migration Yearbook (MIGRACIJOS METRAŠTIS 2021)²¹
01.01.2022	31,028	2022 Migration Yearbook (MIGRACIJOS METRAŠTIS 2022)²²
01.01.2023	48,804	2022 Migration Yearbook (MIGRACIJOS METRAŠTIS 2022)²³
01.09.2023	60,220	Immigrants in Lithuania, Overview 2023 (IMIGRANTAI LIETUVOJE. APŽVALGA 2023)²⁴
01.01.2024	62,167	Migration Yearbook 2023²⁵ / Immigrants in Lithuania Overview (MIGRACIJOS METRAŠTIS 2023. ²⁶IMIGRANTAI LIETUVOJE. APŽVALGA)
01.01.2025	57,511	Immigrants in Lithuania, data as of 1 January 2025 (IMIGRANTAI LIETUVOJE / 2025 m. sausio 1 d. duomenys)²⁷
01.10.2025	51,213	Immigrants in Lithuania, data as of 1 October 2025 (IMIGRANTAI LIETUVOJE / 2025 m. spalio 1 d. duomenys)

Analysis of the dynamics of Belarusian residents in Lithuania (2019–2025)

The analysis of the dynamics of Belarusian citizens residing in Lithuania between 2019 and 2025 reveals a clearly defined phased structure of the migration process.

At the first stage (2019–2020), the number of Belarusians remained relatively stable — increasing from approximately 17.7 thousand to 19.5 thousand, corresponding to the natural labour and educational migration flows recorded before the onset of mass repressions in Belarus.

The second stage (2021–2023) was marked by an explosive increase: within two years, the number of Belarusians more than doubled — from 23,440 to 48,804 by early 2023, and reached 60,220 by autumn 2023.

This period coincided with post-election repression in Belarus and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, when Lithuania became one of the main evacuation and transit routes.

However, starting from 2024, a structural reversal can be observed: after reaching a historic peak of 62,167 Belarusians residing in Lithuania as of 1 January 2024, the number dropped to 57,511 by 1 January 2025 — a decrease of approximately 4.7 thousand in one year. By October 2025, the number further fell by 6,298, reaching 51,213 persons.

The 8% decline, the first throughout the entire observed period, indicates the formation of a reverse flow and the beginning of a mass outflow of Belarusians from Lithuania. This outflow is driven by the state policy of exclusion, hostile public rhetoric and hate speech towards Belarusians, as well as securitizing and manipulative accusations of “national security threats” applied to Belarusian citizens without evidential basis or transparent criteria.

This demonstrates that since 2023, Lithuania has ceased to function as a stable refuge for Belarusian political refugees and increasingly serves only as a temporary transit platform within the broader chain of movements of Belarusian refugees and migrants across the EU.

3) Balance: Outflow and “Escape Coefficient” (annual estimates)

Formula:

Outflow_Y ≈ Stock(Y–01–01) + Inflow_Y − Stock((Y+1)–01–01)

Escape Coefficient = Outflow / Inflow

Methodological notes:

The outflow formula represents a balance estimate derived from administrative registers (stock) and official inflow statistics. Factors such as naturalization, mortality, or emigration to third countries do not significantly distort the annual trend.
Inflow data are taken from official statistics / Migration Yearbooks; stock data — from institutional registers as of the specified dates.
The combination of data sources has been cross-verified for internal consistency.

Table 3. Annual balance of Belarusian migration in Lithuania (2019–2024)

Year	Inflow	Stock as of 1 Jan (Y)	Stock as of 1 Jan (Y+1)	Estimated Outflow (≈)	Escape Coefficient (Outflow / Inflow)
2019	6,388	12,204	17,769	823	0.13
2020	7,279	17,769	23,440	1,608	0.22
2021	8,287	23,440	31,028	699	0.08
2022	9,789	31,028	48,804	–7,987	–
2023	15,675	48,804	62,167	2,312	0.15
2024	5,229	62,167	57,511	9,885	1.89

Key Findings and Interpretation

Sources for calculation: inflow data — see §1; stock data — see §2.

Key result.

The year 2024 marks a visible structural turning point — a shift toward net expulsion: almost two Belarusians leaving Lithuania for every one arriving, alongside a sharp reduction in the total number of Belarusian residents.

The applied formula allows for estimating not only the net migration balance but also the intensity of outflow in relative terms.

Until 2022, the balance remained positive: the number of arrivals exceeded departures, consistent with Lithuania’s official image as a host country and its public EU rhetoric about “protecting Belarusians.”

In 2021, the escape coefficient stood at only 0.086, meaning that for every 100 new arrivals, only about 8 Belarusians left.

In 2022, amid the war and mobilization threats, inflows reached 9,789 persons, while the total stock of Belarusians in Lithuania continued to grow at an accelerated pace. The coefficient turned negative (–0.193), meaning that the resident population was increasing faster than the inflow alone would suggest.

In 2023, a historic peak in inflow was recorded — 15,675 persons. However, this year also marked the beginning of a structural shift: the coefficient became positive (0.148), indicating the emergence of a stable outward migration trend.

By 2024, the trend had acquired a qualitatively different character: with a sharp decline in inflow to 5,229 persons, an estimated 9,885 Belarusians left Lithuania, yielding an escape coefficient of 1.893 — an unprecedented level for a host country.

Thus, for every Belarusian arriving in Lithuania, almost two were leaving.

These data quantitatively confirm the transition from an “asylum model” to an “expulsion model”: administrative pressure, intensified screening, securitizing rhetoric, and manipulative use of the “national security threat” label have produced a negative retention effect, forcing Belarusians to seek further migration routes and safer destinations.

4) Political Asylum and Asylum Trends

4.1. Applications for International Protection – General Overview²⁸

2020: 321 asylum applications (all nationalities).
2021: 4,259 applications (all nationalities) — a surge linked to the border crisis.
2022: 1,051 applications (all nationalities); Belarusians (416) accounted for approximately 40% of all applicants.
2023: 575 applications (all nationalities).
2024: 362 applications (all nationalities); Belarusians represented 39% of all applicants.

At border crossing points (SBGS):

The number of registered Belarusian applications declined — from 17 in 2023 to 6 in 2024. ²⁹

4.2. Granted Asylum (Overall Overview)

Year	Total Applications	Refugee Status Granted	Subsidiary Protection Granted	Asylum Refused	Examination Discontinued	Application Not Examined	Transfers under Dublin III	Total Decisions
2019	646	79	13	233	157	10	7	499
2020	321	80	1	266	254	6	13	620
2021	4 259	443	8	2 768	532	2	30	3 783
2022	1 051	316	21	548	733	6	47	1 671
2023	575	403	1	191	251	1	71	918
2024	362	178	12	235	105	7	33	572

In 2023, 404 persons were granted protection (403 received refugee status; 1 received subsidiary protection).
In 2024, approximately 52% of the decisions on applications were positive (according to the Migration Department of Lithuania, total number of applications – 362).

Breakdown by Belarusian citizens (the exact number of Belarusians granted asylum by year)

Year	Total Applications	Refugee Status Granted	Subsidiary Protection Granted	Asylum Refused	Examination Discontinued	Application Not Examined	Transfers under Dublin III	Total Decisions
2019	18	–	–	5	4	2	–	11
2020	81	1	–	10	9	2	7	29
2021	260	126	–	33	10	1	23	193
2022	416	206	–	18	37	–	–	261
2023	287	306	–	60	37	–	35	438
2024	140	116	–	72	35	3	14	240

Analysis of Asylum Granting Trends in Lithuania (2019–2024)

The data shows a clear shift: since 2021, Belarusians have become the main group receiving international protection in Lithuania — yet, at the same time, decision-making has become increasingly unstable, contradictory, and unpredictable.

Interpretation and Analytical Context

1. Exponential Growth in Applications (2021–2022).

From 2021 to 2023, Belarusians represented the majority of all persons granted asylum in Lithuania.

The sharp increase in applications (from 81 in 2020 to 416 in 2022) correlates with the wave of repression after the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus and the start of the war in Ukraine.

During this period, Lithuania publicly positioned itself as “a safe haven for repressed Belarusians,” combining a rhetoric of solidarity with easier access to asylum procedures and a high share of positive decisions (approximately 65% in 2021 and 79% in 2022).

2. 2023 — a Formal Anomaly.

In 2023, 306 refugee status grants were recorded for 287 filed applications — explained by the “carry-over” of pending cases from the previous year.

However, between July 2023 and May 2024, the rejection rate according to the Migration Department rose from 8.45% to 53%.

Thus, the seemingly positive 2023 statistics mask the beginning of a policy shift toward restrictive criteria.

3. 2024 — the Turn Toward Negative Decisions.

From 2024 onward, a systemic decline is observed both in the number of applications and in the share of positive decisions.

This is linked to the introduction of the VSD security questionnaire and the growing practice of refusals on the grounds of “national security threats.”

The number of applications nearly halved (140 compared to 287 in 2023), while refusals increased to 72 (30%).

This reflects the institutionalization of the “security screening” and the classification of Belarusians as a “risk” category.

In parallel, the number of applications fell further — some Belarusians stopped seeking asylum altogether, fearing denial and deportation.

These figures demonstrate a structural shift — from a humanitarian approach (2021–2022) to a regime of rigid filtration (2023–2024).

4. Overall Context Across All Nationalities.

Despite the general decrease in applications (from 1,051 in 2022 to 362 in 2024), Belarusians continued to make up a disproportionately large share — estimated between 50% and 70% of all asylum seekers.

Thus, Belarusians constituted the core of Lithuania’s asylum system, yet from 2023 onward became its main target of administrative contraction.

This confirms the emergence of a “policy of push-out” — formally neutral, yet effectively aimed at reducing the Belarusian presence under the pretext of “national security.”

5. Diagnosis: The “Humanitarian Policy Paradox”

1. The gap between declared protection and the reality of expulsion.

In 2024, official communications emphasized “increased control” and a targeted reduction in the number of foreigners.

The actual result: a drop in the number of Belarusians residing in Lithuania from 62,167 to 57,500 and a flight coefficient of 1.89.

2. Securitized rhetoric and targeted re-screenings.

Since 2023, large-scale administrative actions have been publicly documented against Belarusians under “national security” justifications — hundreds of refusals, residence permit withdrawals, and retroactive reviews.

Over 2,000 Belarusians were declared “a threat,” with hundreds of negative decisions.

These measures correlate directly with the increase in departures and the decline in the Belarusian resident stock.

3. The “narrowing of asylum gates” amid a high share of Belarusian applicants.

Between 2022–2024, Belarusians remained one of the largest groups of asylum seekers, while the overall flow of applications sharply declined (1,051 → 575 → 362).

Moreover, according to Lithuanian Red Cross monitoring, part of the applications at border crossing points was not registered at all — reinforcing the administrative push-out effect.

4. Secondary re-emigration as an institutional consequence.

When the host country becomes predictably hostile, migrants redistribute toward other EU jurisdictions.

The 2024 balance is a striking indicator: approximately 9,885 departures against only 5,229 arrivals.

6) Conclusions

Lithuania does not retain a significant share of Belarusian arrivals: after the 2022–2023 peak, 2024 marks a clear shift toward net outflow.
The large inflow of 2022–2023 did not translate into stable protection or integration of Belarusians; instead, there was a sharp drop in the resident stock and a pronounced administrative “cooling effect.”
The share of Belarusians among asylum applicants remains high (notably in 2022 and 2024), yet the de facto “gates of asylum” are narrowing.
Lithuania’s political and administrative practice contradicts its publicly declared image as “the best refuge for repressed Belarusians.”

7) List of Key Sources

Migration Department (Lithuania): Latest Migration Yearbook – Key Statistics; press release (18 March 2025) on the reduction in the number of foreign residents; annual Migration Yearbooks (2019, 2020, 2023, 2024); monthly asylum statistics.

https://migracija.lrv.lt/lt/statistika/migracijos-metrasciai

https://migracija.lrv.lt/lt/statistika/menesine-migracijos-statistika

https://migracija.lrv.lt/lt/statistika

Statistics Lithuania (OSP): pages on international migration and citizenship composition (2022–2023).

EMN / IOM Lithuania: data summary on asylum applications — 2022: 1,051 applications; 2023: 575; 2023 grants: 404; 2024: 362 applications, 52% positive; share of Belarusians among applicants in 2024 — 38.7%.

OSW (10 January 2024): dynamics of Belarusian stock in Lithuania (from 48.8 thousand to ≈ 61 thousand during 2023).

Lithuanian Red Cross (2024–2025): monitoring of access to procedures and registration of applications at border crossing points (BCP) — 17 → 6 Belarusian cases registered.

https://redcross.lt/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/ACCESS-TO-PROCEDURE-EN-2024.pdf

1 https://lrv.lt/en/news/prime-minister-congratulated-belarusians-on-freedom-day

2 https://www.mfa.lt/en/news/928/minister-budrys-a-democratic-belarus-is-a-strategic-interest-of-european-security%3A44772

3 https://www.urm.lt/en/news/928/minister-g.-landsbergis-a-year-after-fraudulent-presidential-elections-in-belarus-fight-for-freedom-never-ends%3A34711

4 https://www.mfa.lt/en/news/928/lithuanias-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis-solidarity-among-democratic-states-is-the-strongest-weapon-against-totalitarian-regimes%3A34699

5 https://migracija.lrv.lt/en/news/latest-migration-yearbook-key-statistics

6 https://migracija.lrv.lt/uploads/migracija/documents/files/Migracijos%20metra%C5%A1%C4%8Diai/MIGRACIJOS%20METRA%C5%A0TIS_2018.pdf

7 https://migracija.lrv.lt/uploads/migracija/documents/files/Migracijos%20metra%C5%A1%C4%8Diai/MIGRACIJOS%20METRA%C5%A0TIS_2019%20%281%29.pdf

8 https://migracija.lrv.lt/uploads/migracija/documents/files/Migracijos%20metra%C5%A1%C4%8Diai/MIGRACIJOS%20METRA%C5%A0TIS_2020_1.pdf

9 https://migracija.lrv.lt/uploads/migracija/documents/files/2021%20m_%20migracijos%20metra%C5%A1tis_skelbimui(3).pdf

10 https://osp.stat.gov.lt/en/lietuvos-gyventojai-2022/gyventoju-migracija/tarptautine-migracija

11 https://migracija.lrv.lt/uploads/migracija/documents/files/2022_Migracijos_metrastis.pdf